>>> Question-defense.info

Home page

Breaking news

CAESAR is ready

VBCI in production

French nuke force shrinks

SSBN Le Terrible roll-out

KC-30B flight tests

A330 MRTT roll-out

France orders 68 NH90s

Bastille Day in Paris

Gates meets Morin

France's new CNS

Neuron gets a go

Juliette-Bravo-Lima

Baltic air defence

AJPAE

Libyan Mirages

Final Greek Mirage 2000s

Libya buying Rafales

A new Defence chief

French Army

Renewal urgency

Altengrabow 2007

First Tiger TACEVAL

French Navy

BPC - French LHD

A fourth Hawkeye?

PA 2 programme

Rafales on the "Big-E"

French Air Force

Air Islande 2008

Fire fighting helos

Very first Rafale crash

World defence news

Sagem AASM

COSMO-SkyMed in space

France-Brazil

Spanish Tiger

Astrac & Mirage F1

Embraer

Iraqi COIN deal

VBCI on the go

RMN Scorpene first

Exercises

Gripen meets Mirage

Urubu 2007

New books

Defence policy

Geopolitics

Aviation

Ships

 
 
The future French aircraft-carrier "PA2" designed around a common Anglo-French 66,000-ton ship. The new vessel should be commissionned in 2015 © DCNS
Un des premiers Rafale M/F2 vu sur le pont du "CDG" durant les opérations aériennes du printemps 2007 contre les Taliban dans l'est de l'Afghanistan © Marine Nationale
Why France needs
a second aircraft-carrier


By Antoine Philippe
in Marseille, France


In view of France's vast budget deficit, should France have two aircraft-carriers? That is a much debated issue, and has been for a long time. However, the matter became central again on the occasion of the presidential elections. To this day, even if the decision is taken in 2007 by the new President to build a second one, the aircraft carrier ought not to be serviced before 2015. Actually, since the mid 1980’s, the topic has kept cropping up in the debate on our defense system, when the question is raised of whether to replace the Clemenceau and the Foch. I will not hark back to the beginning of the whole and long mooted issue (it has spanned one generation already), but it is from now relevant to take a hard look at the arguments in favor of a French Defense system arranged around two aircraft carriers.

These warships are part of the great standard tools available to the State for our Defense; they make up the most visible one in fact, as much as our nuclear deterrence along with its SNLE and bombers. One the one hand, nuclear deterrence protects our country against any major aggression (including one that would aim at wiping France off the map); on the other hand, our aircraft carriers make military operations abroad possible, and these are part and parcel of our Defense policy. Incidentally, aircraft carriers strengthen deterrence thanks to a long-distance striking force, including by means of medium range ASMP cruise missiles and of the ASMP-A – to be implemented by 2010.

The role of an aircraft carrier in crisis-management relies first and foremost on the characteristic features of that weapon, which presents itself as a whole system in its own right: it has the flexibility of a military ship, combined with that of an air force. Aircraft carriers are the ideal ships for action abroad, and they have become the great attribute of state powers wishing to fulfill their ocean ambitions, on a regional or even a world level. Does France still meet these criteria in the 21st century? The answer is a wholehearted yes, since there are two parameters that will never change: geography and our Defense culture.
France opens up on to the Mediterranean Sea, and it enjoys the third largest sea space in the world. It is the only European power present in the Pacific, and can also rely on strategic support in the Indian Ocean, such as those that control the oil routes, a commodity in increasingly short supply, that is bound to stir a lot of covetousness. France can make its presence felt on the American continent as well, and in the Atlantic, from the Guyana to the Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon islands, while maintaining close links with Senegal. Lastly, and this is in fact the most important aspect of it, in accordance with its Defense policy, the use of the French army is first of all a mission aiming at stabilizing tensions and keeping the peace.
The future "PA2" seen from above. The "twin castle" lay-out is singular to the common CVF/PA2 design, and is a technical response to electronic side-lobes pollution problems © DCNS
Using the Galileo constellation of satellites, the PA2 will be able to navigate in full autonomy and to provide the ship's aircraft with precise coordinates of their targets, at sea and on the land © CNES
The aircraft carrier: a strategic instrument
for France's Defence

The strategic context that legitimates the use of an aircraft carrier is that it makes it possible, in times of crises, to project air and naval forces onto the theatre of operations, an ability that is all the more vital as 80% of activities in our world take place within 500km of a littoral area.
In the eyes of its advocates, an aircraft carrier is at the disposal of the ambitious diplomatic, oceanic and military policies France is set on developing in Europe and worldwide. Today, France has only one aircraft carrier and can therefore no longer afford to give teeth to its declared ambitions, due to a lack of wherewithal to back them with. Advocating the construction of a second aircraft carrier means that the sustainable operational presence of the aero-naval group (GAN – Groupe Aéronaval) – i.e. one aircraft carrier at sea, along with its own fighter-planes (around 40 of them) and its escort – is still the cornerstone of our action capabilities abroad. To this day, the permanent sea presence of the GAN can no longer be guaranteed by our aircraft carrier alone, the Charles-de-Gaulle, owing to its unavailability periods (40% of its life span). As for the Air Force, in spite of its operational competence and new capabilities (the multipurpose Rafale, equipped with precision weapons), it can no longer guarantee it can take over on crisis zones, mainly because of the deployment constraints that exist at the level of air bases on foreign territories.
The reference period in this respect is from 1960 to 2000, since France had then two big aircraft carriers at its disposal, the Clemenceau and the Foch. For 40 years, both ships relayed each other over crisis zones where France deemed it right to intervene: The Gulf, Djibouti, the Middle-East, the Balkans… It is worth noticing that the Clemenceau, the Foch, then the Charles-de-Gaulle have all demonstrated time and again that they were able to adapt to the strategic departures from the last five decades: de-colonization, the Cold War, interventions in regional crises and, lastly, responding to the 9/11 aggressions. Confronted to the British limitations, (small aircraft carriers only), France determined to endow itself with that high visibility instrument to act as a European power with global clout. All the more so as the small aircraft carriers had shown their operational limitations on the occasion of the Falklands war in 1982. The aircraft carrier corresponds to the status of France on the international scene and to the global scope of its security policy. Let us remember that France is a member of the UNO Security Council, and that it enjoys a very special geographical situation (what with its Mediterranean coasts and its overseas possessions: the DOM-TOM, and so on), that it is committed to several Defense accords and is determined to remain the powerhouse of European Defense, by means of implementing key capacities.
In the eyes of France, owning only one aircraft carrier means no less than being assigned to the role of a second rate naval power, able to be present only part time on the high seas.
The European NH 90 helicopter will replace the old SA 321G Super Frelon mid-size helicopters now some 40-year old © EADS

Operational Advantages of the Aero-naval Group
Let us have a look at the ship's dossier through the perspective of performances, and examine what an aircraft carrier is able to do. The writers of the collective book What perspectives for the second French aircraft carrier? have listed the main ones:
- sovereignty to act, as the ship operates in international waters, outside any diplomatic constraints;
- action can be undertaken while sheltering from terrorist threats and enemy intelligence operations;
- ability to last on the theatre of operations, along with the capacity to revert to fast withdrawal.

An aircraft carrier can be used as the spearhead of land and air forces, but also a projection instrument for an airforce in the immediate vicinity of the theatre of operations, thus reducing the intervention time periods of assault crafts or rescue teams and material. It is to be noticed, as well, that such a ship is able to sail over 800 km per day, and its most interesting feature is its ability to offer a whole set of configurations to decision-makers, who can act in a way better suited to the critical situations at hand: implement aircraft, obviously, but also introduce helicopters, troops, sanitary means, etc.
In this respect, France can present another argument to advocate the building of a second aircraft carrier: the Charles-de-Gaulle itself. The ship, along with its aircraft group, were serviced in 2001 and have since demonstrated the efficiency of that reliable, tried and tested tool – using laser guided weapons – in the Indian Ocean, in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Thanks to it, France can boast indisputable expertise in modern aero-naval operations, and is the only nation able to measure up to the USA, except in terms of volume, obviously. The combination of the Rafale, the NH90 and E-2C Hawkeye helicopters, along with a whole array of precision air to ground weapons, is empowering the French with the sustainability that is required of their operational know-how – which is unique in Europe.

A very varied range of missions

From now on, a large range of scenarios are imaginable, with the aircraft carrier proving to be the operational tool for major strategic functions within a comprehensive defense system (information, command, strike, logistics support, mobility) :
- air support from the sea to ground forces covering all the aspects of a crisis (peace, crisis, engagement, restoration of peace, peace keeping operations);
- command of naval forces;
- protection of sea traffic and control of sea activities (to fight against terrorism);
- humanitarian support, extraction of nationals out of an unsafe zone;
- sea intelligence and towards ground forces;
- nuclear deterrence by means of air to ground nuclear missiles embarked on board.

Besides specific missions to support the French Defense policies, these missions fit in with the ones defined by NATO and the EU, in this particular case, the so-called Petersberg missions, taken into account in the Treaty of Amsterdam.

Military characteristics of the 'PA2' aircraft carrier (R92)

Aircraft: 30/35 Rafale fighter-bombers, 2/3 E-2C Hawkeye EAW&C and 5/8 helicopters.

Armament : ASMP-A nuclear missiles, SCALP-EG cruise missiles with conventional warheads, Exocet AM 39 air to sea anti-ship missiles, air to ground laser guided precision weapons (Paveway II & III) or inertial /GPS (AASM) bombs, MU90 torpedoes, Magic II and MICA air to air missiles, anti submarine weapons. Reco NG image reconnaissance pods. Special forces and commandos.

Embarked situation intelligence systems.

Integrated on-board self-protection measures, advanced EW systems, anti-air missiles (Mistral/Aster), and automatic weapons.

Command Capacities relevant to a naval force.

Crew: 1 700 men and women.

Displacement: 66 000 tonnes

Dimension: 283 m (against 261, 5 m dor the CDG)
While a fourth aircraft is in consideration, The Aéronavale's three up-dated Hawkeye 2000s will be a key tool on-board the 'PA2' © J.-M. Guhl

The development of big and small aircraft-carriers in Europe
and throughout the world

Another factor encouraging France to build two aircraft carriers results from the present and expected proliferation in terms of aircraft carriers and small carriers all over the world. Without a second aircraft carrier, France is liable to find itself relegated to the rank of a second rate power among the great global powers, and its international standing would be seriously mitigated, to say the least.
The USA alone have got 24 aircraft carriers, i.e. twelve 100 000-tonne giant carriers able to accommodate 80 to 90 aircraft to which can be added 12 combat amphibious small aircraft carriers. Washington expects to maintain and modernize that aero-naval force, considered as the most powerful in the world. The United Kingdom has planned the building of two small aircraft carrier (to be serviced by 2015) to replace the present ships.
Spain can boast one small aircraft carrier, and another one, whose capacities will be greater, is to be built by 2008. On the same model, Italy has got a small aircraft carrier, and a second much bigger one is due to join the Navy next year.
Russia and India own one big aircraft carrier each. Several other regional powers have decided to join the “club”, and have planned to upgrade their military navy mainly based on small aircraft carriers or helicopter carriers. South Korea is about to arm two helicopter carriers (due by 2007 and 2010). Japan flaunts three large helicopter carriers, while Thailand has purchased one small helicopter carrier. Australia is about to acquire a large small-aircraft carrier. As for Brazil, it is proud of its Sao Paulo, the French former Foch aircraft carrier. China does not lag behind in the present race: with the wealth generated by its fast expanding economy, it intends to build two large aircraft carriers, to be serviced by 2015. They are allegedly to be armed with 30 aircraft.

Aircraft carriers and inter-allies cooperation
Some political leaders are toying with the idea, an a priori attractive proposition, of using an aircraft carrier in common with other countries within the EU or of hiring one from the British, during the times when the Charles-de-Gaulle is not available. This evinces a very inaccurate knowledge of the dossier, both for technical and political reasons.
Today, France has already made the choice of building that second ship, in cooperation with the United Kingdom, actually, on the basis of the scheme adopted by the Royal Navy, which has planned to build two ships. However, even though the French and the British projects will have the same hull in common, the two ships will be designed to accommodate quite different aircraft: the JSF F-35, a US-based American one, with vertical take-off as far as the British are concerned, and the multipurpose Rafale in the case of France. In the Royal Navy, the ship will have a reclining ramp for the take-off phase. When coming back from their missions, the fighters will land vertically, just like helicopters. Such a ship will be absolutely unable to accommodate the Rafale fighters, since they need a catapult to take off, and arresting wires for landing, and these devices are not to be installed on board the two British aircraft carriers.
At the political level, the idea of the joint building of the ships would mean France would altogether give up its sovereignty in terms of foreign policy and Defense. However, the most crucial options France has chosen might well depart from the ones preferred by the United Kingdom, as the Iraq crisis has been enough evidence of. By the way, have the British and the other Europeans been asked what they thought? As for the French, they officially gave their answer on the future of Europe … on 29 May 2005. On that occasion, a great majority of French citizens simply turned down Europe with a plain “No”.
Besides, due to its configuration (catapults, arresting wires, and its flat deck), the concept of the French aircraft carrier is the only one in the world that is compatible with the ones in the USA, hence making it possible to organize a joint command of operations. In this respect, it is to be noticed that the French Navy boasts the same E-2C Hawkeye radar aircraft as the US Navy (the Group II version, to be quite accurate). That aircraft provides the structure of the command of an aero naval operation, and its very efficient electronics enables it to control the air space over a radius of 500 km. France has three of these at its disposal, and they have been allocated to the 4F Flotilla.
The French Navy ships are already able to be operated within NATO from a technical point of view (especially in terms of tactical data), as well as at procedure level. Our European allies, besides, are well-equipped in modern frigates and supply ships. Therefore, they have the capability of escorting our aircraft carrier, a mission they have performed successfully several times (in the Balkans, the Indian Ocean). That is where inter-allies cooperation can take place, and it is also at that juncture that the European means can be managed on a mutual basis. This is not to say that the French Navy should, for all that, forsake its capacity to protect our greatest units, witness the equipping schedules in modern Horizon and FREMM type frigates, or then again the modernization of its powerful fleet, dedicated to anti-mine war.

The cost of the second aircraft carrier
The estimated figure for the PA2 — likely to be named Richelieu, the cardinal who created the Marine Royale under French king Louis XIII — reaches the €2.5b mark, an amount that is to be staggered throughout the duration of its building, planned to last between 6 and 8 years. The observers of the debate around the French presidential elections will have noticed that the ship would involve less than 0.4 % of the Education budget. It could be serviced in 2015, coinciding with the second Scheduled Interruption for Maintenance and Repair (Deuxième Interruption Programmée pour Entretien et Réparation, IPER) of the Charles-de-Gaulle. Moreover, the French tax-payers have already footed the bill for the planes to be allocated to that second ship. They have already been serviced or have been ordered, pending delivery: 38 Marine Rafale fighters have been ordered and 12 already delivered, out of the targeted 60 of them, three E-2C Hawkeye radar aircraft are already available, as well as the helicopters, which are to be reinforced by 2010 with a few NH90. France already has all the weapons necessary to the operations of the air group (naval patrol aircraft and support ships), as well as the satellites warranting the sovereignty of the action of the GAN: SYRACUSE (telecommunications) and Hélios (intelligence and accurate sighting of objectives). To sum up, in order to ensure the permanent sea-presence of the Aero Naval Group, what is left to do is order a supplementary number of Rafale fighters…plus the aircraft carrier itself!


Main book references:
Jean-Michel Guhl, Le Charles-de-Gaulle et son groupe aérien embarqué
(SPE Barthélémy, 2005).
Pierre Pascallon, Quelles perspectives pour le deuxième porte-avions français ?
(L’Harmattan, 2000).
Bernard Prezelin, Flottes de combat 2006
(Editions Maritimes & d’Outre mer - Edilarge, 2006)

Copyright © Q-Def & J.-M. Guhl - 2007 — editor @ question-defense.info

Web Hosting powered by Network Solutions®

Defence news from France in English